Abstract We investigate the e¤ects of individual top managers on wages and wage policies. A large longitudinal administrative dataset from Portugal allows us to match workers, …rms and top managers, and follow the movements of the latter across di¤erent …rms over time. We estimate the role of top manager …xed-e¤ects in determining wages and wage policies, while also accounting for the e¤ect of worker and …rm heterogeneity. Our results reveal that top managers have a signi…cant in ‡uence on wages, the returns to schooling and tenure, the gender wage gap, and the extent of rent sharing. Furthermore, they point to the existence of managerial styles in the setting of wage policies. Finally, we relate worker compensation to observable managerial attributes, and …nd that returns to schooling tend to be higher in …rms led by more educated top executives, while longer-tenured managers appear on average to engage in more rent sharing.
Introduction
Facilitated by the increased availability of longitudinal matched worker-…rm datasets, the empirical analysis of wage determination has undergone important progress in recent years. In the presence of such data it has become possible to estimate, amongst many other things, the worker and …rm components of compensation determination, allowing for observable and unobservable factors in both dimensions. As a result, key advances have been made in the study of several classical questions in labour economics e.g. the source of inter-industry wage di¤erentials, the wage e¤ects of seniority, and the basis of the wage-…rm size relationship Abowd et al., 2006) .
Worker and …rm characteristics are clearly important determinants of compensation. Yet casual observation would suggest that the employment relationship in general and wage policies in particular tend to re ‡ect as well other, perhaps less tangible, factors, such as the preferences and style of the …rm's top managers. For instance, top executives seem to di¤er in the extent to which they are willing to engage in rent sharing with their workers. Also, some top managers appear to attribute relatively more importance to formal education, while others seem more prone to rewarding professional experience or seniority. Often, executives are perceived to hold di¤erent views on the importance of promoting gender equality in the workplace.
In this paper we study the e¤ects of individual top managers on wages and wages policies.
Drawing on unusually rich administrative panel data from Portugal, we are able to match the records of individual workers, …rms and top managers, and track the movements of the latter across di¤erent …rms over time. The conditions are met, thus, to begin tackling several new questions:
Can the heterogeneity in wages and wage policies be explained by manager …xed-e¤ects? Is there any evidence of di¤erences in style across managers in the setting of wages and wage policies? Is worker compensation systematically associated with managerial observable attributes?
To investigate whether and how manager …xed-e¤ects matter for wage determination, while also accounting for the role of worker and …rm observable and unobservable heterogeneity, we resort to a simple combination of well known estimators, namely the spell …xed-e¤ects and the least squares dummy variables (LSDV) estimators. Given the longitudinal (and linked) nature of our worker-…rm data, the by now standard spell …xed-e¤ects estimator enables us to sweep away worker and …rm …xed-e¤ects Andrews et al., 2006) . Adding the possibility of tracking the top managers across di¤erent …rms over time implies that the LSDV estimator may then be used to explicitly estimate manager …xed-e¤ects.
Our results provide evidence that manager …xed-e¤ects are signi…cant determinant of wages, the returns to schooling and tenure, the gender wage gap, and the extent of rent sharing. Adding manager …xed-e¤ects to a wage equation that already controls for the role of worker and …rm heterogeneity leads to a signi…cant improvement in the goodness of …t. Furthermore, the analysis of manager e¤ects points to the existence of managerial styles in the setting of wage policies. Top executives who on average engage in more rent sharing also tend to lower the returns to schooling and tenure, suggesting that managers may di¤er in their preferences towards more egalitarian pay 2 policies. Finally, we investigate whether and how managerial observable attributes matter for wages and wage policies. Our estimates indicate that returns to schooling tend to be higher in …rms led by more educated top executives, and that top managers with more time in o¢ ce appear on average to engage in more rent sharing.
While this paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the …rst to explicitly estimate the importance of manager …xed-e¤ects for wage determination, it is clearly not the …rst to be concerned with the e¤ects of managers on wage policies. Thus far, research in this vein has drawn particular attention to the relation between the gender of managers and the gender wage gap amongst workers. Using worker-…rm matched data for Sweden, Hultin and Szultin (2003) …nd that the gender wage gap tends to increase if males are relatively more represented amongst organisational managers, while Bell (2005) , based on individual data for the US, provides evidence that female top managers appear to narrow the wage gap between female and male executives. Also for the US, but using industry-level data, Cohen and Hu¤man (2007) …nd that wages of both males and females tend to be lower in industries with a high female representation among managers. Employing the same dataset used in the current paper, Cardoso and Winter-Ebmer (2007) show that wages of female employees tend to be higher, while compensation of male workers tends to be lower, in female-led …rms.
Our investigation is also stimulated in part by the creative paper of Bertrand and Schoar (2003) who study the e¤ects of top managers on …rm policies by means of an empirical framework which shares many similarities with our own. Using longitudinal matched manager-…rm data for the US, they …nd that manager …xed-e¤ects are an important determinant of a wide range of corporate policies, such as acquisition or diversi…cation decisions, dividend and cost cutting policies, and interest coverage. Additionally, their results point to the existence of general di¤erences in style across managers, especially with regard to their approach towards company growth and …nancial aggressiveness, and suggest that the degree of managerial aggressiveness is systematically associated with observable attributes of top executives, notably age and holding an MBA. 1
Our paper can also be seen as a contribution to the personnel economics literature, particularly to the strand of research concerned with the design of optimum compensation policies within a …rm; see Lazear and Oyer (2009) for a recent review. In sharp contrast with such an analysis, our paper is totally free of normative content. Yet our positive analysis of manager wage e¤ects might provide complementary insights to this line of work, notably by quantifying the extent to which there is scope for top managers to in ‡uence worker compensation once the role of worker and …rm characteristics is accounted for.
A sizeable body of research exists on the drivers of executive pay, and much is by now known about the factors explaining its steep rise in recent years. Key references include Murphy (1999) , Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) , Murphy and Zabojnik (2004), Frydman (2005) , Cuñat and Guadalupe (2006) and Gabaix and Landier (2008) . The current paper is related to this literature but is not a contribution to it. Our interest lies in the e¤ects of top managers on worker compensation, not in the determinants of their own pay.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy for estimating manager …xed-e¤ects and presents the corresponding results. In Section 4, we analyse the magnitude of the manager …xed-e¤ects for wages and wage policies. We then examine if the relationship between manager …xed-e¤ects points to general di¤erences in style across managers in the setting of worker compensation. In Section 5, we investigate whether and how wages and wage policies are systematically associated with manager observable attributes. Finally, Section 6 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
Data
We draw on data from An important attribute of these data is the high reliability of the information. Indeed, the data are used by the Ministry of Employment for checking the employer's compliance with labour law.
Additionally, Portuguese law makes it compulsory for …rms to make this information available to every worker in a public place of the establishment.
Crucially for our purposes, the worker records in Quadros de Pessoal contain detailed information on the individual's occupation in the corresponding …rm in each year, thereby allowing to directly identify the top managers. Speci…cally, based on the Portuguese Classi…cation of Occupations (1994 version) , the top managers may be identi…ed as the individuals performing the occupations: "corporate directors and chief executives" (code 121) and "directors of small …rms"
(code 131). Given that the unique and time invariant identi…ers in the worker data also apply to the top managers, tracking their movements across di¤erent …rms over time is straightforward.
We have performed extensive checks to guarantee the accuracy of the employee and …rm data, according to the procedures outlined in the Appendix. After these checks, we kept for analysis full-time wage earners working at least 25 hours a week, aged between 16 and 65, earning at least the national minimum wage, employed in manufacturing and services in …rms located in mainland of workers and 6.0% of worker-year observations in the checked panel), "partnership" (65.4% of …rms, 64.9% of workers and 52.5% of worker-year observations) and "public limited company"
(3.2% of …rms, 36.6% of workers and 32.7% of worker-year observations). 4 Since our identi…cation strategy relies on the movements of the top managers across di¤erent …rms, and the role of the top executives is likely to be in ‡uenced by the …rm's ownership structure, we restrict our analysis to "partnerships". The resulting dataset comprises 1,853,423 workers, 271,841 …rms and 251,661
(1,061,499 observations) top managers, yielding a total of 7,119,323 worker-year observations for the period 1995-2005. 3 Estimation of manager …xed-e¤ects
Construction of the linked worker-…rm-manager panel
In line with Bertrand and Schoar (2003) , the construction of the linked worker-…rm-manager panel data involves the following steps. We begin by restricting our attention to the top managers that we observe in at least two …rms over the sample period. This reduces the number of top managers in our sample to 14,800. We then keep only those top managers that stay at least three years in each …rm (imposing also that matching worker data are available for each three-year period the top manager is in o¢ ce in each …rm). 5 As a result, the number of top executives is further reduced to 687. Finally, we keep all yearly observations for the …rms (and their corresponding workers) in which these top managers are observed (thus including the yearly observations in which the …rm is led by top managers that we do not observe in multiple …rms). The resulting matched worker…rm-manager dataset includes information on 1,282 …rms, 687 top executives and 13,433 workers, yielding a total of 39,840 worker-year observations. Table 1 presents means and standard deviations of the worker and …rm variables for two di¤erent samples. The information reported in the …rst two columns refers to the worker-…rm-manager sample for the top executives that we observe in multiple …rms, after imposing the restrictions described above. The last two columns refer to the total worker-…rm-manager data for "partnerships" wherein …rms and 783,673 workers, yielding a total of 2,178,421 worker-year observations.
Sample description
In our "switchers" sample, top executives that move across …rms stay on average more than four years in a given …rm, slightly less than those in the full sample. As in the Bertrand and Schoar (2003) , switching top executives tend to work in larger and more productive …rms. These …rms also pay better on average, and tend to employ more educated and slightly younger workers. In addition, the two samples di¤er in terms of geographical location: switching executives work mainly in Lisbon, while overall top managers are mainly employed in …rms from the North of Portugal.
An interesting feature of the "switchers sample" is that a large proportion of top executives tends to move within rather than across two-digit industries. Indeed, the proportion of moves within industries is 71 percent, well above the 37 and 29 percent reported by Bertrand and Schoar (2003) for CEO and CFO, respectively.
Econometric method
We estimate the e¤ects of top managers on wages through a linear equation of the form:
where: x it is a vector of time-varying individual characteristics, y jt a vector of time-varying characteristics for …rm j at which worker i is employed in year t; i an individual unobserved …xed-e¤ect; j a pure …rm unobserved e¤ect; T M a top manager …xed e¤ect; k a pure industry e¤ect; r a pure region e¤ect; t a …xed time e¤ect; and, …nally, ijt is an exogenous disturbance.
The vector of worker observable characteristics includes gender, age and its square, years of schooling, tenure and a dummy variable indicating whether the worker has less than one year of tenure. The vector of …rm characteristics comprises …rm size (log of number of employees), age, and …rm sales per worker (log of …rm annual sales per employee). To control for unobserved pure industry e¤ects, we add a full set of eighteen industry-dummies, corresponding to the economic classi…cation code (1 st revision) de…ned at the 2-digit level for manufacturing and services industries.
Region-e¤ects are captured by four dummy variables de…ned for …ve regions in mainland Portugal, according to the classi…cation NUTS 2. Wages and …rm sales are converted to real terms (2005 prices) using, as is standard in the literature, the CPI and the GDP de ‡ator, respectively. 6
To account for the role of worker and …rm unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate spell (worker…rm) …xed-e¤ects models. By time-demeaning within each unique worker-…rm combination (or spell), this estimator sweeps away both i and j Andrews et al., 2006) . Manager …xed-e¤ects can then be explicitly estimated by means of the standard LSDV estimator, i.e. a dummy variable for each of the 687 top executives in our "switchers" sample (equal to 1 if the top manager is at the …rm and 0 otherwise).
To investigate the e¤ects of top managers on rent sharing, we add an interaction term between T M and …rm sales per worker ( RS ). This is essentially the same strategy adopted by Bertrand and Schoar (2003) for estimating the e¤ects of top managers on …rm policies. Similarly, to study the e¤ects of top managers on returns to schooling and tenure, and on the gender wage gap, we interact T M with the corresponding worker-level variables (thereby obtaining, respectively, the interaction terms S , T , G ).
It is worth noting that since we restrict the analysis to top executives that we observe in at least two …rms (for a period of at least three years in each …rm), manager …xed-e¤ects will only matter if wages and wage policies are correlated across …rms during the period in which the top manager is in o¢ ce.
Results
In Table 2 we report F-tests, adjusted R 2 s, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) yielded by the estimation of several variants of equation (1).
The …rst row reports the results from a pooled OLS regression which includes only worker and …rm time-varying controls, region …xed-e¤ects, industry …xed-e¤ects and time-e¤ects. The speci…cation reported in the second row includes also all these regressors, but is estimated by an individual …xed-e¤ects model. The third row refers to the case where a spell (worker-…rm) …xed-e¤ects model is used instead, and constitutes our benchmark for analysing the role of manager …xed-e¤ects 6 Data on CPI and GDP de ‡ator come from the National Statistics Institute of Portugal. 7 and interaction terms. Manager …xed-e¤ects are then added to this benchmark speci…cation in the fourth row. The remaining rows report the results yielded by speci…cations that additionally include interactions terms between manager …xed-e¤ects and inter alia schooling, tenure, gender, and …rm sales per worker. For each of these speci…cations, we also report F-statistics from tests of the joint signi…cance of manager …xed-e¤ects and interaction terms. Notes: Results are based on the manager-…rm-worker "switchers sample" described in sub-section 3.2 and Table 1 . Standard errors are clustered at the …rm-level. Reported in the second column are F-tests on the joint signi…cance of the top manager …xed-e¤ects and interaction terms. For each F-test we report the value of the F-statistic, the p-value and the number of constraints. The last three columns report the adjusted R 2 , AIC and BIC from each speci…cation.
The statistical results suggest that top manager …xed-e¤ects are signi…cant determinant of wages and wage policies. Adding manager …xed-e¤ects and manager interaction terms to a wage equation that already accounts for the role of worker and …rm observable and unobservable heterogeneity (as well as industry, region and time e¤ects) leads to an improvement in the goodness 8 of …t (irrespective of whether it is measured by the adjusted R 2 , the AIC, or the BIC). Furthermore, F-tests clearly indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis that each set of manager …xed-e¤ects and manager interaction terms are zero.
Our estimates also shed light on the relative importance of worker, …rm and top manager unobserved heterogeneity in explaining worker compensation. In line with previous studies, they suggest that unobserved …rm heterogeneity has considerably less explanatory power in determining log wages than unobserved worker heterogeneity does Cornelissen and Hubbel, 2007 ). An important contribution of this paper is to show that the same conclusion applies to unobserved managerial heterogeneity.
Robustness checks
One potential concern with our estimates of manager …xed-e¤ects is that they might not be capturing the active in ‡uence of top managers on wages and wage policies. For instance, one might worry that the estimated top manager …xed-e¤ects might re ‡ect in part the spurious correlation of wage policies across …rms during the period in which the top managers happen to be in o¢ ce, rather than their active in ‡uence.
We carry out a number of checks to address this concern. First, we assume that each switching top manager in our data joins the second …rm three years before the actual year of entry and leaves that …rm at the moment of actual entry. The construction of this counterfactual scenario requires that matching worker data for the second …rm in those years are available, which reduces the number of switching top managers to 119. We then compare the change in the goodness of …t yielded by the inclusion of such fake manager …xed-e¤ects, with that resulting from the inclusion of the true manager …xed-e¤ects for the same 119 top managers. The corresponding results are reported in the upper part of Table 3 . Clearly, the improvement in the goodness of …t yielded by the true manager …xed-e¤ects is greater than in the counterfactual (fake) scenario, suggesting that our estimates are indeed capturing the active in ‡uence of top managers on wage policies. As an alternative robustness check, we assume that the each top manager is at the …rst …rm for a period of three years after the actual turnover date (and is absent from the …rm before that date). In this case, we are left with information on 304 switching top executives. The corresponding results for the adjusted R 2 s, AIC and BIC are reported in the lower part Table 3 and, once again, reassure us that our estimates are capturing the active in ‡uence of top managers on wage policies. Notes: Results are based on sub-samples of the manager-…rm-worker "switchers sample" described in sub-section 3.2 and Table 1 , contructed under the assumption that the period in which each top manager is at one of the …rms is di¤erent, according to the procedures described in sub-section 3.4.1. For all speci…cations (including the baseline) the results are obtained from spell …xed-e¤ects panel regressions, where the standard errors are clustered at the …rm-level. For each scenario, the three columns report the adjusted R 2 , AIC and BIC from each speci…cation.
The role of …rm-and managerial team-size
Intuitively, we might expect the in ‡uence of switching top managers to depend on factors such as …rm-or managerial team-size. Indeed, it can be argued that larger …rms tend to have relatively more rigid wage policies, making it potentially more di¢ cult for top managers to print their own mark. Similarly, it is arguably plausible to speculate that top managers have more room to impose their own style in the setting of wage policies when they integrate a relatively small managerial team. Notes: Results are based on the manager-…rm-worker "switchers sample" described in sub-section 3.2 and Table  1 , split by …rm-and managerial team-size as described in sub-section 3.4.2. For all speci…cations (including the baseline) the results are obtained from spell …xed-e¤ects panel regressions, where the standard errors are clustered at the …rm-level. For each TM classi…cation, the three columns report the adjusted R 2 , AIC and BIC from each speci…cation.
To empirically examine these conjectures, we split our sample according to both these criteria.
Speci…cally, columns (2) to (4) in the upper part of Table 4 consider only the data for the top managers that move across …rms with less than ten employees, while columns (5) to (8) comprise all remaining cases. In the lower part of Table 4 , columns (2) to (4) consider only top executives that move across …rms in which they represent at least 50 percent of the managerial team, whereas columns (5) to (8) comprise the remainder cases. 7 While the di¤erences in sample size across groups call for a particularly cautious reading of the results, the evidence presented in Table 4 suggests that …rm size is relatively more important for the explanatory power of top manager …xed-e¤ects than the size of the managerial team. Indeed, for a fairly similar number of observations, we …nd that the improvement in the goodness of …t associated with the inclusion of top manager …xed-e¤ects and interaction terms is relatively more important in the sub-sample of small …rms than in the sub-sample of small managerial teams.
Analysis of manager …xed-e¤ects 4.1 Magnitude of manager …xed-e¤ects
We now proceed by examining the magnitude of the estimated manager …xed-e¤ects for wage policies. Table 5 reports descriptive statistics on the distribution of each set of estimated manager …xed-e¤ects, on the basis of speci…cation (8) in Table 2 . To account for estimation error, we also compute weighted statistics where each estimated …xed-e¤ect is multiplied by the inverse of its standard error. Notes: The …xed e¤ects used in this table are retrieved from the regressions reported in speci…cation (8) of Table  2 . If "Yes" in the second column, the …xed e¤ect is weighted by the inverse of its standard error to account for estimation error.
An inspection of Table 5 reveals that the heterogeneity in the magnitude of top manager …xed-e¤ects is economically important. For instance, the di¤erence between a manager at the twenty…fth percentile in the returns to schooling distribution and one in the seventy-…fth is 0.07, which compares with an average estimate of returns to schooling in our sample of 0.004 (see Table A1 ).
Also, the di¤erence between the twenty-…fth and seventy-…fth percentile in the distribution of rent sharing is 0.16, against an average estimate of rent sharing in our sample of 0.006. Further, is worth noting that like in Bertrand and Schoar (2003) the median manager …xed-e¤ects for most variables are close to zero, suggesting that our focus on outside hires does not entail signi…cant selection problems. 8
Management styles
Is there any evidence of managerial styles in the setting of wage policies? To address this question we analyse relationship between the estimated manager …xed-e¤ects for the various wage policies.
In other words, we estimate the following equation:
where k indexes top managers and F E(a) and F E(b) are the estimated interaction terms between manager …xed-e¤ects and any two worker (or …rm) variables from speci…cation (8) in Table 2 .
Following Bertrand and Schoar (2003) , we use a GLS estimation technique to account for the measurement error in the right-hand-side variable, by weighing each observation by the inverse of the standard error on the independent variable (obtained from the …rst step estimations). The results reported in Table 6 point indeed to the existence of managerial styles in the setting of wage policies. Top executives who on average engage in more rent sharing also tend to lower the returns to schooling and tenure, which seems to support the view that top managers di¤er in their preferences towards more egalitarian pay policies. Additionally, our results suggest that top managers who tend to increase the returns to schooling appear also more prone to narrowing the gender wage gap.
Observable managerial attributes
Do managerial observable attributes matter for wages and wage policies? This is the question we set out to address in this section. In particular, we investigate the extent to which there is a 8 For further discussion on this matter see Bertrand and Schoar (2003) pp. 1191.
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systematic association between wages and wage policies, on the one hand, and the age, gender, schooling and tenure of the …rm's top managers on the other hand.
Econometric method
To investigate the e¤ects of top manager observable characteristics on wages, we estimate a linear equation of the form
where: z jt is a vector of average observable attributes of the top managers at …rm j in year t, and the remaining variables have the meaning de…ned above. z jt includes the proportion male top managers in …rm j in year t, and the average age, schooling and tenure of all top executives at the …rm in each year. Tenure is de…ned as the number of years the individual has been at the …rm in the capacity of top manager.
As before, we estimate spell (worker-…rm) …xed-e¤ects models to account for worker and …rm unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore, identi…cation comes from the within-spell variation in average top manager attributes over time. To study the e¤ects of top manager observable attributes on wage policies, we interact each of these variables with …rm and worker characteristics, namely sales per worker, schooling, tenure and gender. Conceptually, this is the same empirical framework used by Bertrand and Schoar (2003) to investigate the e¤ects of CEO observable attributes on …rm policies.
It is worth noting that our identi…cation strategy no longer relies on the ability to follow the top managers across di¤erent …rms over time. Rather, it is based on changes over time in the average characteristics of the …rms'top managers, which can result from both internal and external hirings. Accordingly, our econometric analysis is based on the full longitudinal matched dataset for "partnerships", as de…ned in Section 3.2. 
Results
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Concluding remarks
In this paper we have investigated the e¤ects of top managers on wages and wage policies. Drawing on longitudinal matched worker-…rm-manager data from Portugal, we were able to track the top managers across di¤erent …rms over time, and study the role of top manager …xed-e¤ects in explaining wages, the extent of rent sharing, the returns to schooling and tenure, and the gender wage gap. Our results indicate that manager …xed-e¤ects are a signi…cant determinant of wages and wage policies, and point to the existence of general di¤erences in managerial style in the setting of worker compensation. Additionally, they provide evidence that observable attributes of top executives, notably age, schooling and tenure, are systematically related to wage policies.
By way of conclusion it should be emphasised that while the ability to track the top managers across di¤erent …rms is a key ingredient of our empirical framework, top executives are clearly not randomly assigned to …rms. Accordingly, our estimates of manager …xed-e¤ects should not be interpreted as the causal impacts of top managers on wages and wage policies, but rather as evidence that there is a systematic association between the identity of the top managers and worker compensation.
(ii) Keeping observations from manufacturing and services. 
